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Abstract 
The logic behind globalized advertising appeals is based on the premise that 
cultural value systems are converging. Yet, there is no clear agreement regarding the 
superiority of standardized campaigns vs. localized ones. One reason for this lack of 
agreement deals with the extent to which various cultures share similar values. The 
goal of this study is to apply a relatively new framework dealing with value differences 
developed by Schwartz [Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25 (1992) 1.] to New Zealand and 
the USA by looking at the connection between these values and possessions. The 
hypotheses received mix support. The results confirm that New Zealanders are 
higher in Harmony and Affective Autonomy, and these values did, in part, affect 
possessions and reasons for owning them. New Zealanders’ most valued 
possessions were for environmental reasons, but they were no more likely to mention 
enjoyment reasons than Americans. New Zealanders also did not mention 
recreational possessions as more important, contrary to one of the hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, the similarities between NZ and the USA were much greater than the 
differences. The study provides valuable insight into how the meanings of important 
possessions differ across cultures and illustrates the need to understand these 
differences when designing marketing communications and positioning products in 
foreign markets. 
 
1. Introduction  
As economic globalization intensifies, standardization of marketing mix elements can 
be an optimal approach to gain economies of scale. Indeed, global standardization can be 
seen in products, brands and advertising (van Raaij, 1997). Advertisers view standardized ad 
campaigns as a panacea to rising costs from localized advertising in each market. However, 
such standardization may not ‘‘fit’’ with the cultural variances around the world. De Mooij 
(1998) views the argument that cultures are developing similar values as superficial and 
misguided. She contends that national value systems are enduring, and these are integral to 
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consumers’ perceptions of advertising. According to DeMooij (1998, p. xiv) ‘‘The success of a 
business depends in the end on how well its products reach customers whose behavior is 
affected by values that may vary in all kinds of unexpected ways from those of the business’ 
managers.’’ To ignore these differences is to invite failure.  
Although companies such as Coca-Cola, McDonalds and Ralph Lauren have 
succeeded with global advertising, many other firms have suffered from ignorance of cultural 
differences. A recent example occurred in Mexico in 1998 when women were offended by 
near-naked women in Wonderbra ads and boycotted their products until a particular 
advertising campaign was withdrawn. As firms extend their reach to foreign markets, such 
misunderstandings are likely. Hence, the crux of the problem is to identify differences in 
values, determine how they influence product choice, and, subsequently, advertise 
accordingly.  
De Mooij (1998) contends that values are at the core of a culture and influence the 
perception of symbols and rituals, among others. These values are acquired by mental 
programming in the enculturation process. Without understanding a country’s core cultural 
values, miscommunication in advertising is likely. These core values have a powerful 
influence on a country’s characteristics and consumer behavior. Cultural values serve as the 
criteria its members use to determine what behavior is appropriate, to guide self-presentation 
and to justify their choices to others (Rokeach, 1973; Smith and Schwartz, 1997; Vinson et al., 
1977b). Within the context of consumer behavior, cultural values have been used to explain 
patterns of behavior (Ford et al., 1995; Green and Alden, 1988; Tse et al., 1988; Wallendorf 
and Arnould, 1988) and differences in attitudes (Andrews et al., 1991; Ger and Belk, 1966; 
Grunert and Scherhom, 1990; Lee, 1993; Unger, 1995).  
Despite Levitt’s (1983) assertion that the globalization of markets is inevitable due to 
convergence of values, research suggests cultural differences persist. As such, research on 
values can illuminate critical marketing dimensions related to advertising and product 
positioning. Given this background, the goal of this study is to focus on the value differences 
between the USA and New Zealand (NZ) and how these affect possessions. Without 
understanding the importance of possessions, effective advertising appeals are unlikely, 
especially pattern advertising using similar appeals for global markets. Effective 
communication demands ‘‘knowing your customers’’ and the parameters that affect them 
such as cultural values.  
Most cross-cultural studies provide comparisons among cultural groups without a 
strong underlying theory to explain differences. It is far better to explain observed differences 
with a theory (Smith and Schwartz, 1997). In this paper, the cultural-level value theory 
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proposed by Schwartz (1994a) is used to explore the relationship between cultural values 
and important possessions. This theory provides a compelling and powerful perspective in 
which to examine cultural differences. The USA and NZ were chosen since they are culturally 
very similar, yet, past research has identified differences in consumption aspirations (Bryce 
and Olney, 1991), consumer perceptions (Gordon and McKeage, 1997) and both personal 
and cultural values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). Differences in values are likely to affect reasons 
for ownership of possessions (Prentice, 1987).  
The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we provide background literature on 
cultural values, examine the Schwartz (1992) approach to measure culture and discuss the 
significance of understanding important possessions. The hypotheses are presented in the 
first part of the paper. After the methodology is discussed, the results concerning value 
differences and important possessions are provided. The paper concludes with implications 
and directions for future research.  
 
2. Background and Hypotheses  
‘‘Culture’’ has been described as a society’s personality or as the glue that binds 
people together. As an explanatory variable, it allows the investigation of a society’s 
dimensions such as its values. When used to characterize and distinguish between cultures, 
values represent socially shared abstract ideas about what is good, right and desirable 
(Hofstede, 1994). According to Smith and Schwartz (1997, p. 80), five common features of 
values suggest that values: (1) are subjective and emotional beliefs; (2) refer to desirable 
goals and act as modes of conduct that promote these goals; (3) transcend specific actions 
and situations; (4) serve as guidelines to evaluate behavior; and (5) differ in how they are 
prioritized as an ordered system.  
Individuals acquire values through socialization by dominant groups and through 
learning experiences (Schwartz, 1994a). Cultural values may take cognitive form as groups 
respond to their environment and express their responses in the ‘‘language of specific values 
about which they can then communicate’’ (Schwartz, 1994b, p. 21). Values may be ‘‘truisms’’; 
people agree highly with the importance of particular values, but lack cognitive rationale 
(Maio and Olson, 1998). Many attitudes and behaviors are based on values and, collectively, 
they characterize cultures or nations.  
Research has sought to identify ‘‘universal’’ values that characterize and distinguish 
cultures (Kluckholn and Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Schwartz, 
1994a; Trompenaars, 1993). Hofstede’s (1980) seminal study provided the first empirically 
and conceptually based set of value dimensions to compare cultures. The value dimensions 
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by Hofstede are widely accepted, yet, there are serious limitations (Bond and Forgas, 1984; 
Leung, 1988; Kagitcibasi and Berry, 1989) concerning the number of values (Hofstede, 1980; 
Schwartz 1994a), their universality (Shackleton and Ali, 1990; Schwartz, 1994a) and the 
nature of the data (Schwartz, 1994a). The Value Survey (1973) with 36 values was one of the 
initial approaches to measure values in marketing (Vinson et al., 1977a). Subsequently, 
Kahle and Timmer (1983) developed a more parsimonious measure using nine values called 
the List of Values (LOV). Unfortunately, these approaches have been criticized as 
ethnocentric since they reflect USA culture (de Mooij 1998).  
Recently, Schwartz (1994a) developed a new theory of cultural-level values and a 
different method for measuring such values. To overcome limitations of previous research on 
values, Schwartz used both Western and non-Western sources to derive cultural value 
dimensions and controlled for meaning equivalence. The Schwartz cultural-level value 
system, exhibiting both external and convergent validity, represents the most promising 
framework for cross-cultural comparison of universal values (Bond and Smith, 1996). For this 
reason, we used the Schwartz cultural-level approach to values.  
 
2.1. Schwartz’s Cultural-level Values  
Schwartz (1992) proposed that values represent a structure of interacting belief 
systems, the collection of which constitutes culture. Undergirding this conceptualization, 
Schwartz (1994a) developed a theory of conflicts and compatibilities among seven value 
types as follows:  
1. Conservatism: maintenance of the status quo, proprietary and restraint of actions that 
might disrupt group solidarity and traditional order (e.g., social order, respect for tradition, 
family security).  
2. Intellectual Autonomy: independent ideas and the rights of the individual to pursue his/her 
own intellectual directions (e.g., curiosity, creativity, broad mindedness).  
3. Affective Autonomy: individual pursuit of affectively positive experiences (e.g., pleasure, 
exciting life, a varied life).  
4. Hierarchy: legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power roles and resources (e.g., social 
power, authority, humility, wealth).  
5. Egalitarian Commitment: transcendence of selfish interests to interests, which serve the 
common good (e.g., equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility and honesty).  
6. Mastery: getting ahead through self-assertion (e.g., ambition, success, competence).  
7. Harmony: fitting harmoniously into the environment (e.g., unity with nature, protecting the 
environment).  
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Smith and Schwartz (1997, p. 86) postulated that each value type has ‘‘psychological, 
practical and social consequences that may conflict or be compatible with the pursuit of other 
types.’’ For example, if Autonomy is emphasized within a culture, the importance of 
Conservatism (its opposite type) is depressed. ‘‘This is necessary in order to ensure 
consistent socialization and reinforcement of behavior and to foster smooth institutional 
functioning’’ (Schwartz 1994a, p. 98).  
Schwartz (1994a) developed an instrument to measure cultural-level values by 
selecting specific values to represent each value type; these were drawn from previous 
research, including Rokeach’s (1973) value survey and from religious and philosophical 
writings found in different cultures. By consulting survey instruments developed in other 
cultures (Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Chinese Culture Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980), 
Schwartz (1994a) avoided imposing a Western-imposed etic. The Schwartz approach 
provides a cross-culturally validated instrument for measuring cultural-level values and a 
comprehensive, near universal set of value types for studying cultural differences. Data 
collected in 54 countries from approximately 44,000 subjects confirmed the theorized content 
and structure of the cultural-level value types (Smith and Schwartz, 1997). In addition, 
Schwartz ranked nations on each of the seven values. This approach can identify cultural 
values; these values then can be used to understand the meaning that people attach to 
products as discussed below.  
Schwartz’s (1994a) ordering of nations for the cultural-level values reveals that NZ 
and the USA are different on two value types only. Specifically, New Zealanders value 
Affective Autonomy and Harmony more than Americans do (Schwartz, 1994a). Therefore, 
the first hypothesis can be stated as:  
Hypothesis 1: Americans, in comparison to New Zealanders, have lower scores on 
Affective Autonomy and Harmony.  
 
2.2. Cultural Values and the Private Meanings of Important Possessions  
McCracken (1988) suggests that the identity of products is given meaning by the way 
it is transmitted in the cultural system, while Belk (1988) views our identities as constructed 
by our possessions (Belk, 1988). Hence, a person’s most important possessions reflect 
personal values and inner self (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Wallendorf and 
Arnould, 1988). Owners of possessions cultivate private meanings of possessions reflective 
of their values (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Richins 1994a). The collectivity 
of these private meanings relates to the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings about 
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the importance of an object (Richins, 1994b). These private meanings of their possessions 
characterize a person’s values (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, 1981).For instance, 
a person who values ‘‘conservatism’’ may treasure an antique Hamilton pocket watch as a 
family heirloom because it symbolizes family ties and heritage. Alternatively, a person who 
values ‘‘mastery’’ may treasure the same watch because it symbolizes prestige and 
enhances one’s self-concept.  
An individual cultivates both social and personal meanings through interactions with 
an object over time (Richins, 1994b); such private meanings of possessions are shaped by 
and reflect one’s culture (Grunert and Juhl, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Smith and Schwartz, 1997; 
Vinson et al., 1977b). Hence, the private meanings associated with important possessions 
should reflect dominant cultural values. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be stated:  
Hypothesis 2: New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, evaluate important 
possessions (A) in terms of enjoyment because of their higher levels of Affective Autonomy 
and (B) in terms of unity with nature and protection of the natural environment because of 
their higher levels of Harmony.  
 
2.3. Important Possessions  
Affective Autonomy, expressed through enjoying life and pleasure, relates to freedom 
of individual feeling and action. Accordingly, possessions that provide independence, 
enjoyment or sensory pleasure may reflect affective freedom. The value Harmony focuses on 
the environment and unity with nature. While it is difficult to own ‘‘the environment,’’ some 
possessions may embody this value since they allow aesthetic and physical awareness of 
the natural world. Although New Zealanders have higher levels of Affective Autonomy and 
Harmony than Americans (Schwartz, 1994a), explaining how these differences affect 
important possessions is problematic. For example, a person who values his/her wedding 
ring as most important seems to differ markedly from a person who values his/her sports car. 
However, on closer examination, both people may identify interpersonal reasons for the 
importance of these possessions. The wedding ring may be cherished for its symbolic 
association with a spouse, while the sports car may be favored because it came from a loved 
one and symbolizes the importance of that relationship. Hence, different types of 
possessions may provide similar private meanings. In contrast, the same possession can 
provide radically different private meanings to different individuals. For example, recreational 
equipment such as a bicycle could be valued because of its technical superiority to achieve 
athletic excellence (i.e., mastery). Alternatively, the individual may value quiet bike rides in 
the country and viewing nature’s beauty (i.e., Harmony). Consequently, the purchase of the 
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bike may be motivated by values that are polar opposites, depending on the person.  
Because cultural values influence self-images (Best and Williams, 1994; Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991), cultural-level values may also influence peoples’ choices of their most 
important possessions. Hence, the following hypothesis can be stated:  
Hypothesis 3: New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, identify their most 
important possessions that reflect their higher ratings of Affective Autonomy and Harmony 
(Schwartz, 1994a).  
 
3. Method  
3.1. Data Collection  
Data were collected from the general population by mail surveys administered in the 
USA and NZ. The USA data were obtained by selecting systematically 700 names from 
telephone directories in a Mid-Atlantic state. Fundamental principles from the Dillman (1978, 
1984) ‘‘Total Design Method’’ for telephone and mail surveys were used. The NZ sample of 
1000 respondents was drawn systematically from the electoral roll whereby registered voters 
had an equal opportunity of selection. Over 90% of the NZ population over the age of 18 are 
registered voters. Usable questionnaires were returned by 46% (N=322) of those sampled in 
the USA and 45% (N=446) in the NZ sample.  
 
3.1.1. Measures  
3.1.1.1. Values  
The Schwartz (1994a) Value Inventory and the recommended procedure were used 
to measure the importance of the seven culture-level value types. The instrument asks 
respondents to rank and then rate various values. It consists of 45 items (as featured in Table 
1) that measure the seven value types: Hierarchy, Mastery, Affective Autonomy, Intellectual 
Autonomy, Egalitarian Commitment, Harmony, and Conservatism. The alpha coefficients (to 
measure reliability) for the USA and NZ samples were respectively: .60 and .62 for 
Hierarchy; .66 and .60 for Mastery; .68 and .75 for Affective Autonomy; .61 and .59 for 
Intellectual Autonomy; .73 and .72 for Egalitarian Commitment; .78 and .73 for Harmony; 
and .80 and .83 for Conservatism. These reliabilities are comparable to those reported by 
Schwartz (1994a) and sufficient for reliability.  
 
3.1.1.2. Important possessions.  
Respondents identified their most important possessions by responding to the 
following statement: ‘‘Many people have a few possessions that they care a lot about or that 
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are especially important to them. In the space below, please identify your most prized 
possessions and explain why they are important to you.’’ Respondents were asked to list 
their three most important possessions and the reasons for their importance.  
Using Richins (1994a,b) framework, possessions were coded using 13 groups as 
follows: sentimental objects, assets, transportation, practical objects, recreational, personal 
appearance, extension of self, aesthetic and other. Given the limitations in her categorization 
scheme, three additional categories were added: (1) people/friendships; (2) pets; and (3) 
possessions such as plants and gardens that emphasize the environment. The reasons 
given for the importance of the possessions were content analyzed using the coding scheme 
developed by Richins (1994a,b), which was initially designed to examine the relationship 
between possessions and personal values. The categories were utilitarian, enjoyment, 
interpersonal ties, identity, financial aspects, appearance related, ownership/control and 
other/ unclassified. Because Richins developed the scheme using a different population, 
additional content categories (which emerged from the data) were also included. These five 
additional categories concerned possession value based on educational value, information 
value, irreplaceability, health and the object’s ability to create unity with nature or to protect 
the environment.  
Both possessions and reasons were content analyzed independently by two judges 
for the American sample and two different judges for the NZ sample. Because of some 
language nuances, it was appropriate to use judges familiar with their colloquialisms and 
jargon. These judges were trained in advance to insure consistent coding. Any 
disagreements were resolved through discussion between judges. For possessions, coder 
agreement was 95% for the USA sample and 97% for the NZ sample. For the reasons of 
their importance, coder agreement was 94% for NZ sample and 93% for the US sample.  
 
3.1.2. Sample Characteristics  
An attempt was made to match the sampling frames with national proportions on 
three demographic dimensions: location of residence (i.e., urban, nonurban); income; and 
age. These three variables were selected because of their potential impact on questions 
related to values and consumption. For location of residence, both samples for the USA and 
NZ were proportional to their national breakdowns. For the US, 63% were from an urbanized 
area and 37% were from a nonurbanized area (US Bureau of Census, 1990). Similarly, the 
NZ respondents were 62% urban and 38% nonurban (Statistics NZ, 1997). Regarding age 
and income, the samples for the USA and NZ were also comparable to the general 
population for each country.  
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4. Analysis and Results  
4.1. Testing of Hypothesis 1: Comparison of Cultural-level Values  
Repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for value 
differences. Country (USA/NZ) served as the independent variable, and the seven 
cultural-level value types — Conservatism, Egalitarian Commitment, Harmony, Mastery, 
Hierarchy, Affective Autonomy and Intellectual Autonomy — served as the dependent 
variables in the analysis. The traditional univariate F statistics resulting from simple ANOVAs 
were not valid because of the correlations among the value types. In order to test the simple 
main effects of country (USA/NZ), it was necessary to calculate the error estimate pooled 
between-and within-subjects variation (Winer et al., 1991).  
Hypothesis 1 was supported as shown by the statistical differences on three of the 
values in Table 2. Specifically, the USA respondents were higher in Conservatism, lower in 
Harmony, and lower in Affective Autonomy. Although this result on Conservatism differs from 
Schwartz (1994a), it is probably because Schwartz’s respondents were primarily 
schoolteachers — a highly educated group — while those in our sample were a cross section 
of the general population in NZ.  
 
4.2. Testing of Hypothesis 2: Private Meanings of Possessions  
With respect to the private meanings of possessions, it was hypothesized that New 
Zealanders would be more likely to name reasons of enjoyment and environment for the 
importance of their prized possessions. The USA sample provided 1132 reasons for valuing 
the 823 possessions they characterized as important — an average of 1.4 reasons per 
possession. New Zealanders provided 1632 reasons for valuing their 1047 most important 
possessions — an average of 1.6 reasons per possession. Table 3 features the 
categorization of these reasons.  
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To determine if New Zealanders provided different private meanings for the 
importance of their prized possessions compared to Americans, z tests for differences of 
proportions were also used. Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported. Consistent with their 
value of Harmony, Table 3 shows that New Zealanders listed environmental reasons for 
valuing their important possession more frequently than Americans (z=3.43; P<.001). 
However, New Zealanders were no more likely to mention enjoyment as a reason for valuing 
their possessions (z=1.51, P<.10), which was contrary to our expectations given the value of 
Affective Autonomy for New Zealanders. Other differences between the two countries were 
also evident. New Zealanders were more likely than Americans to value possessions for 
interpersonal (z=-4.05, P<.01) and financial reasons (z=-2.99, P<.01), but Americans were 
more likely to value possessions for utilitarian (z=2.53, P<.05), appearance-related (z=4.06, 
P<.001) and ownership and control (z=3.60, P<.001) reasons.  
A final analysis was conducted to see if New Zealanders and Americans identify 
different reasons why the same type of possession is important (e.g., Are recreational 
possessions predominantly valued for enjoyment reasons, or assets for financial reasons?). 
Previous studies investigating the private meanings of possessions have not examined this 
relationship (e.g., Prentice, 1987; Richins, 1994a,b). Findings indicate that New Zealanders, 
compared to Americans, were more likely to value assets (z=-2.3, P<.05) and recreational 
items (z=-2.63, P<.01) for interpersonal reasons and transportation (z=-2.45, P<.05) for 
financial reasons. In contrast, Americans were more likely to value transportation (z=3.41, 
P<.001) and appearance-related possessions (z=2.46, P<.001) for interpersonal reasons.  
 
4.3. Testing of Hypothesis 3: Types of Possessions 
z Tests for differences of proportions were used to test whether New Zealanders and 
Americans differed in the types of possessions they identified as important. These results 
appear in Table 4 and partially support Hypothesis 3. Respondents in the USA and NZ listed 
on average 2.5 and 2.4 valued possessions, respectively. New Zealanders were more likely 
to identify environmental possessions as important (z=-3.88, P<.001), but were less likely to 
identify recreational possessions as important (z=2.01, P<.05). Americans were also more 
likely to identify practical objects (z=3.47, P<.001), appearance-related possessions (z=7.41, 
P<.001) and aesthetic objects (z=5.34, P<.001) as important. New Zealanders were more 
likely to identify sentimental objects (z=-5.63, P>.001) and possessions representing 
extensions of the self (z=-3.37, P<.001) as important. In addition, New Zealanders were more 
likely to identify people/friendships as their most important possessions (z=-2.67, P<.01) than 
Americans.  
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5. Discussion and Implications  
The first research question guiding this study concerned the differences in cultural 
values between NZ and the USA. New Zealanders value Harmony and Affective Autonomy 
more than Americans. The latter finding is consistent with previous research examining 
differences between the USA and NZ (cf. Bryce and Olney, 1991). Unlike the Schwartz’s 
(1994a,b) findings, Americans, in general, placed more importance on the Conservatism 
value than those in NZ.  
When examining how value differences were related to the important possessions for 
respondents from the two countries (i.e., Hypothesis 3), NZ and the United States are more 
similar than distinct. Their cultural-level value hierarchies are nearly the same, and the top 
four categories in which respondents identified important possessions were almost identical. 
The four categories for New Zealanders were assets (23%), sentimental objects (21%), 
transportation (15%) and recreation objects (9%). Similarly, the top four categories identified 
by Americans were assets (22%), transportation (16%), recreation objects (12%) and 
sentimental objects (11%). Only the frequency of these categories differed between the two 
countries. These frequencies, however, were most noticeable and quite substantial for 
interpersonal items.  
New Zealanders were far more likely to identify sentimental objects and 
people/friendships as important possessions, possessions that have a retrospective 
orientation. Sentimental objects such as family heirlooms and photos act as symbols of 
familial and personal history and illustrate an outlook more focused on the past. Likewise, 
possessions representing extensions of the self, such as souvenirs and trophies, serve as 
records of previous accomplishments. In comparison, Americans seem more pragmatic, 
concerned with the present. The recreational possessions (e.g., sporting equipment) and 
practical objects (e.g., appliances and tools) identified by Americans as important offer their 
owners immediate benefits. Hence, the finding may apply to the design of advertising for the 
two countries; appeals drawing on nostalgia are likely to be more effective in NZ, whereas 
American consumers may be more drawn to products that satisfy immediate desires.  
Americans were also more likely to value personal appearance (e.g., clothing and 
jewelry) and aesthetic (e.g., paintings and antiques) possessions. Wallendorf and Arnould 
(1988) theorize that the value of aesthetic possessions often relates to a need to enact social 
differentiation. Art objects, particularly rare and unique ones, help people to express their 
individuality and, thus, to differentiate themselves from mainstream consumer culture. The 
fact that Americans were more likely to value ‘‘individuating’’ objects (e.g., artwork) might be 
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partially explained by their vertically individualistic orientation, which promotes a 
self-difference from the others (see Triandis and Gelfand, 1998). In contrast, New Zealanders 
are discouraged from standing out, what they refer to as ‘‘Tall Poppy Syndrome,’’ and 
individuals within their society are encouraged to blend in with the others (what Triandis and 
Gelfand, 1998 call a horizontally individualistic orientation). Advertisers who do not 
understand this distinction could be in for disastrous results if they placed advertisements 
with ‘‘individuating’’ themes in NZ. Such appeals are likely to be viewed negatively and could 
have an undesirable effect on the image of the brand.  
The value–behavior relationship was also examined in more depth by focusing on the 
different reasons why specific types of possessions were important for respondents from the 
two countries. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported in that New Zealanders were much more 
likely to identify plants and gardens as important possessions than were Americans, and 
these possessions were more likely to be valued for environmental reasons. This result is 
consistent with the differential importance that New Zealanders place on the value Harmony. 
When recreational possessions were examined, however, the results were not consistent 
with our expectations. New Zealanders, in comparison to Americans, identify interpersonal 
reasons for the importance of recreational items, but they are no more likely to express 
enjoyment reasons for recreational items than Americans.  
Other results offer other insights not associated with the hypotheses. For example, 
interesting results were found for home ownership. Compared to New Zealanders, 
Americans were significantly more likely to express ‘‘identity’’ and ‘‘ownership’’ reasons why 
their assets (i.e., houses) were important. Although neither group was significantly more or 
less likely to identify houses as important possessions, their reasons were different — 
providing a significant contrast in value systems. Whereas New Zealanders were more 
concerned with the security provided by their homes and the interpersonal relationships that 
are maintained there, Americans stated that owning a home was valued because of the 
accomplishment it signified; the house was theirs, a part of who they are, and what they have 
done.  
The goal of this research was to apply Schwartz’s theory of values to explain 
cross-cultural differences in possessions and the concomitant meaning of these for 
marketing and advertising practice. The results suggest that this theoretical framework does 
explain cross-cultural differences and can be used to garner insight into how the meanings of 
important possessions differ across cultures. These findings offer an understanding of why 
people in different cultures buy things and why they view some possessions as more 
important than the others. Indeed, there does seem to be a connection between values and 
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possessions; a connection that marketers can exploit. The results that were contrary to those 
hypothesized need further inquiry. Perhaps, there are other forces operating in these cultures 
that were not identified by the Schwartz typology. Future research needs to probe this 
concern.  
In summary, the Schwartz approach clearly has practical use. Even in situations in 
which such differences are very subtle, as in the case of NZ and the United States, this 
information can be very useful in the design of advertising appeals. Despite Levitt’s (1983) 
argument that consumers throughout the world are becoming so similar that the globalization 
of markets is inevitable, there is still a case to be made for the importance of cross-cultural 
consumer research. Differences do exist, and a lack of recognition of this fact can 
unnecessarily expose companies to risks that could have easily been avoided, even in 
countries viewed as culturally very similar. This type of research provides an opportunity to 
improve our understanding of consumption and to better understand consumers from an 
international perspective — a fundamental concern as globalization accelerates.  
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Table 2: Differences between Americans and New Zealanders for cultural-level values ANOVAs 
 
 
Note: The mean importance rating for each value type was simply the average of the individual values that represent that particular value type.
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Table 3: Differences in private meanings of possessions for Americans 
and New Zealanders 
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Table 4: Differences in type of possessions for Americans and New Zealanders 
 
 
